The New Oakland Athletics

OK, for years people (myself included) have been referring to teams that focus on acquiring players with high on-base and slugging percentages as "Moneyball" teams. Chief among these were the Red Sox, Athletics, Yankees, etc.. But we all had it wrong.

Because the Moneyball concept was about finding the aspects of the market that were under-valued, and exploiting them, NOT about fixating on certain components, like HRs or walks. I'm not saying anything revolutionary, I know, but hear me out... this is going someplace.

I was really surprised as, while crunching 2010 team stats, I noticed that the Oakland Athletics were not only 3rd amongst all 30 MLB teams in steals (156), they were also 2nd in stolen base percentage (80%). WTF? If you think about it, for years the A's rolled out rosters filled with big-time sluggers, OBP guys, and dudes who hit 20 HRs but struck out 170 times... and seemed to completely abhor the concept of the stolen base. Now they're not only running, but they're focusing on guys who run well, up-and-down the lineup; which signals a serious, long-term commitment to the steal as an offensive weapon.

What changed? And when the hell did this happen?

Well, the reality is that the market changed. Back in 2003 when Moneyball was published, MLB teams under-valued players with OBP and SLG skillsets, so the A's jumped on those particular attributes. But as the league caught up, they were forced to adapt. If you look at the table below, you can see that they've gone from 31 totals steals in 2005, and increased that by more than 500% in 2010.

Because the market has been severely undervalued for things like speed and defense, the A's have latched onto those, and despite a tiny budget (28th in MLB at $51,654,900 last season), they've managed to stay relatively competitive, winning 81 games and finishing in 2nd place in the AL West last season.

A different way to show the change in philospophy (or better yet, the way the Moneyball philosophy has changed their approach) is to compare their lineup in 2002 with the current team, as follows:

A few things you should take note of:

• While the 2010 A's obviously run a lot more, those players that run a lot are allowed to do so because they steal at a high percentage. This was a basic Moneyball tenet - don't give up outs.
• The 2002 A's had several players (Miguel Tejada and Erik Chavez) who in their best years, together would've hit more HR than the entire 2010 lineup (72). They came close in 2002, with 68.
• Rajai Davis had more steals (50) than the entire 2002 lineup.
• You can still see examples of undervalued OBP/SLG skillsets in the current lineup; Jack Cust and Daric Barton are perfect examples. They will take advantage of any market inefficiency that they can find.
• And while it's not pictured here, the ideas on pitching are pretty much the same: draft/acquire a lot of young arms, because they're not cheap to buy on the open market. They tried to catch lightning in a bottle last year with Ben Sheets, but that was a $10MM mistake (4-9, 4.53). 
• The main difference in pitching philosophy, I think, is that college pitchers are in high demand now, because they're much lower risk than the high-school equivalent. So the A's have drafted high-school pitching prospects like Trevor Cahill (2nd) & Vin Mazzaro (3rd) higher than they might've previously, and acquired guys like Gio Gonzalez and Brett Anderson after they've proved out to some degree in the minor leagues.